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Abstract: Cost overruns are a recurrent problem in hydrocarbon (oil and gas) megaprojects 8 
and whilst the extant literature is replete with studies on their incidents and causes, underlying 9 
theories that explain their emergence remain scant. To mitigate the occurrence of cost 10 
overruns, an understanding of ‘why’ and ‘how’ they occur must be accrued; such knowledge 11 
provides managers with the foundations to develop pragmatic techniques to attenuate them. 12 
This paper explains the nature of cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects through the 13 
theoretical lens of chaos theory. The underlying principles of chaos theory are reviewed and 14 
its research implications for examining cost overruns identified. By conceiving megaprojects 15 
as chaotic or dynamic systems, the industry and research community are better positioned to 16 
develop ‘innovative’ solutions to mitigate cost overrun occurrence. 17 
 18 
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Introduction 21 
Despite advancements in project management theory and practice, cost overruns are a 22 
leitmotiv within hydrocarbon (oil and gas) and other infrastructure (social and economic) 23 
megaprojects (Reina and Angelo, 2002; Eden et al., 2005; Jergeas, 2008; Love et al., 2011; 24 
Rolstadås et al., 2011). In 2012, for example, Chevron announced a cost overrun of AU$9 25 
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billion on its Gorgon Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project and a revised estimated project 26 
cost of AU$52 billion (representing a 40% increase in their original 2009 budget) (Kombargi 27 
et al., 2012). Cumulatively during 2012, companies such as Chevron, Woodside, BG, Santos 28 
and Exxon Mobil lost approximately AU$25 billion in cost overruns (Ker, 2011). These 29 
staggering cost overruns can adversely impact an oil and gas company’s financial profitability, 30 
as well as other organizations involved with project delivery. Moreover, cost overruns 31 
jeopardize a company’s reputation and can trigger a significant fall in its share value. For 32 
example, cost overruns incurrred by Woodside for its Pluto Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 33 
project led to the company’s share price plummeting by AU$1 billion (Ker, 2011). Such 34 
stark lessons have forced megaproject owners to acknowledge the negative implications 35 
of cost overruns and take action to mitigate them. A typical action employed involves 36 
placing intense pressure on operators, contractors and service providers to improve their 37 
performance and augment productivity (Ford et al., 2014).   38 
 39 
Persistent cost overrun problems discourage capital investors and already, infrastructural 40 
investments in Australia’s oil and gas industry (expected to be  AU$150 billion within 41 
the next ten years) are in limbo due to prevailing doubts about financial viability (Daley 42 
and Macdonald-Smith, 2013). For instance, Woodside discontinued its plan to build 43 
onshore facilities for its Browse floating Liquifued Natural Gas (LNG) project in 44 
Western Australia due to cost burdens (Pearson, 2015); and Shell shelved its Arrow LNG 45 
project in Queensland, Australia due to potential cost blowouts and high investment risks 46 
(Macdonald-Smith, 2015a). Whilst in Canada, Suncor Energy Inc cancelled its proposed 47 
$11.6 billion Voyageur oil sands upgrader project due to rising costs (Lewis, 2013). 48 
Despite these adverse impacts, research examining the nature of cost overruns within 49 
hydrocarbon megaprojects has been limited.  50 
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 51 
The extant literature has explained cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects as a 52 
consequence of an array of exogenous issues, which include logistical challenges in 53 
remote locations, wage costs, regulatory complexity, misdirected execution, misaligned 54 
objectives and technical challenges (Bloomberg, 2009; Jergeas and Ruwanpura, 2010; 55 
Ford et al., 2014). One significant issue relates to the ineffectiveness of project 56 
management tools and techniques used for project delivery (Asrilhant et al., 2006). 57 
According to Love and Edwards (2013), the push to produce oil or gas encourages 58 
decision-makers to become less risk averse. Consequently, errors are propagated and often 59 
manifest as rework during construction, therefore negatively impacting upon project cost 60 
and schedule performance, safety and the assets integrity. Indeed, the factors that can 61 
determine cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects are almost limitless and difficult to 62 
measure. 63 
 64 
Traditionally, the delivery of hydrocarbon megaprojects has relied on conventional project 65 
management theory yet, such projects are fraught with uncertainties that affect cost 66 
performance (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985; Van Thuyet et al., 2007). Hence, hydrocarbon 67 
megaprojects are difficult to manage especially during the construction phase, and using 68 
conventional project management tools and techniques are largely ineffective because they 69 
are reliant upon highly defined components rooted in certainty (Asrilhant et al., 2006; Loch 70 
et al., 2011). Accordingly, more sophisticated perspectives are required to better understand 71 
how uncertainties can be managed (Cleden, 2012).   72 
Historically, chaos theory has presented a useful theoretical lens that is able to reconcile the 73 
essential interdependencies of variables contributing to uncertain events (Levy, 1994). Singh 74 
and Singh (2002) and Remington and Zolin (2011) suggest that it can explain nonlinear and 75 
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complex interactions that develop dynamically in megaproject systems. It is proposed 76 
therefore that chaos theory provides a contextual backdrop for understanding the emergence 77 
of overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects. Consequently, this paper aims to reconceptualise 78 
the occurrence of cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects as being the outcome of systems 79 
that obey the principles of chaos theory. Against this backdrop, the paper commences with an 80 
in-depth literature review to identify fundamental differences between the principles 81 
underlying chaos and conventional project management theory. The characteristics of chaos 82 
theory are then explained before discussing its relevance to hydrocarbon megaprojects. The 83 
application of chaos theory to explain ‘how’ cost overruns occur in hydrocarbon megaprojects 84 
is provided with practice-based examples. Finally, the implications of chaos theory for the 85 
management of hydrocarbon megaprojects is presented.  86 
 87 
Chaos versus Conventional Project Management Theory 88 
In simple terms, chaos is understood as a state of randomness, disorderliness or confusion/ 89 
uncertainty (Reichl, 2004). Chaos theory represents a study of dynamic systems that contain 90 
non-linear components and are usually unpredictable over time (Schuldberg, 2011). 91 
Unpredictability in dynamic systems stems from continuous changes that enable systems’ 92 
stability or instability at different times (Haigh, 2008). Chaos theory positions itself in stark 93 
contrasts to conventional project management that is based on linear thinking and is described 94 
being regular, even, stable and predictable (Schuldberg, 2011). The difference between 95 
linearity and nonlinearity is the presence of nonspecific and disproportionate effects in the 96 
latter (Tsoukas, 1998). Chaos theory demonstrates that conventional models explain naturally 97 
occurring events in only limited cases (Thietart and Forgues, 1995). Linearity asserts that 98 
causes and effects within a system have a proportional relationship; that is, the impact of an 99 
action is directly proportional to the magnitude of the force producing the action (Schuldberg, 100 
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2011). In contrast, chaos theory seeks to understand the behavior of systems that fail to 101 
proceed in a traditional cause-and-effect manner (Murphy, 1996). 102 
  103 
Many natural or physical systems disobey the traditional logic of science that underpins the 104 
basis of conventional project management (Checkland, 1999; Maani and Cavana, 2000; 105 
Sterman, 2000). Within complex projects, the relationships between their cause and effect 106 
phenomena are neither direct nor equal or proportionate. As previous studies suggest, chaos 107 
theory provides an ameliorated understanding of the issues influencing performance in 108 
complex projects and contradicts conventional project management theory (e.g. Singh and 109 
Singh, 2002). Conventional project management theory defines project management success 110 
as being dependent upon many variables, including: planning method; schedule management; 111 
quality control or management; use of technology; communication method or management; 112 
human resources management; and monitoring and control management (Cooke-Davies et al., 113 
2007). 114 
   115 
Conventional project management practice utilizes top-down command and leadership 116 
structure, and utilizes methods and principles that are based on the assumption that stability, 117 
coordination, regularity, control and predictability can be achieved (Singh and Singh, 2002; 118 
Love et al., 2011). Extant literature has relied on conventional management theories in 119 
analyzing what, how, when and why a project fails (Melgrati and Damiani, 2002). For instance, 120 
a project is deemed unsuccessful if objectives (e.g. cost, duration, operational performance) are 121 
not met (Lim and Mohamed, 1999). This crude definition of failure neglects uncertainty that 122 
may ensue at the conception phase. Conversely, chaos theory establishes that within a 123 
predictable system (such as a project), a parameter could react to small changes in its initial 124 
condition and then creates variations to ‘anticipated’ outcomes being observed (Frear, 2011). 125 
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Unless such changes to predefined initial conditions are known and managed efficiently, 126 
deterministic predictions using conventional tools and techniques will continue to under-127 
perform or/ and fail (Cicmil et al., 2006). Therefore, conventional project management are 128 
unsuitable for managing hydrocarbon megaprojects (Cooke-Davies et al., 2011; Love et al., 129 
2011). Figure 1 illustrates the fundamental difference between chaos and conventional project 130 
management theory guiding the delivery of hydrocarbon megaprojects.  131 
 132 
 133 
 134 
 135 
 136 
 137 
 138 
 139 
Figure 1. Difference between chaos and conventional project management theory 140 
 141 
Chaos theory is a pervasive science that widely affects other fields of study, yet its application 142 
to construction and engineering project management remains scant despite studies such as 143 
Singh and Singh (2002) and Remington and Zolin (2011) extolling its merits. Thus, demands 144 
to rethink current management practice have been widely espoused (Melgrati and Damiani, 145 
2002; Cicmil et al., 2006).  146 
 147 
Characteristics of Chaos Theory 148 
Various views of chaos theory found in the normative literature are presented in Table 2. 149 
Where’s table 2? However, the key attributes of chaos theory can be summarized as: (1) 150 
Chaos 
Theory 
Irregular 
Indeterminism 
Flexible   
Non-linear 
Unpredictable 
Instability  
  
Regular 
Determinism 
Rigid  
Linearity 
Predictability 
Stability  
  
Conventional 
Project 
Management 
Theory 
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sensitive dependence on initial conditions; (2) positive feedback; (3) bifurcation and 151 
catastrophic phase changes; and (4) strange attractors (Kiel and Elliott, 1996). These attributes 152 
are discussed hereinafter. 153 
 154 
Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions 155 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, otherwise known as the butterfly effect, assumes 156 
small influences cause significant consequences (positive or negative) that cannot be predicted 157 
(Schuldberg, 2011). This was illustrated by Lorenz’s (1993) study of a deterministic model of 158 
the earth’s atmosphere (Kellert, 1994; Tsoukas, 1998). Kellert (1994) suggested that unstable 159 
behavior within the system is sensitive to small changes in its initial conditions. A hydrocarbon 160 
megaproject in the construction phase is highly sensitive to change (Asrilhant et al., 2004). For 161 
example, a drawing omission of an electrical component can easily be overlooked when 162 
perceived as insignificant at the point in time the event occurred. The long-term effects of such 163 
error are difficult to predict particularly where there is a high degree of reciprocal 164 
interdependence between stakeholders and where activities are undertaken concurrently. For 165 
instance, a minor detail missed creates an error in a component design and then initiates a 166 
domino effect on other activities across the entire project. Consequently, high-levels of rework 167 
are required at a later stage to resolve problems created by that error, thereby generating 168 
significant cost overruns. 169 
 170 
 171 
 172 
Positive Feedback  173 
Positive feedback occurs when actions taken to regulate or normalize a system cause further 174 
disintegration within (Reigeluth, 2004). In a linear system, stability is achieved using negative 175 
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feedback in which corrective action is needed to prevent its deviation from its ordinary course 176 
(Murphy, 1996). From a chaos theory perspective, a system is dominated by positive feedback 177 
in which its future state is dependent upon the initial or earlier conditions (Tsoukas, 1998). 178 
Attempts to influence the system increase the likelihood of its collapse. In a megaproject, any 179 
change made to an activity undertaken (e.g. cost management, risk management, 180 
communication management, scheduling and quality management) creates conditions that 181 
continue to support themselves, leading to positive reinforcing cycles or positive feedback 182 
loops (Remington and Zolin, 2011). A positive feedback loop could include an occurrence of 183 
further project delays due to fast tracking. Negative feedback (i.e., regulates or corrects) and 184 
positive feedback (i.e., amplifies deviations) can cause significant further changes to the 185 
system’s existing condition as well as continuously introduce new patterns of behavior 186 
(Hilborn, 2000). In hydrocarbon megaprojects, its implementation within specified 187 
environmental objectives often leads to the selection of technology that contributes to cost 188 
overruns. For instance, environmental concerns within North Caspian Operating Company 189 
Business Ventures (a company acting on behalf of Consortium partners including KMG, Eni, 190 
Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Conoco and Inpex.) prompted the use of specialised technology to 191 
trench, lay and backfill simultaneously in Kashagan oil and gas megaprojects (Delpont, 2012). 192 
The use of conventional technology would have left trenches open over the three stages and 193 
led to an environmental catastrophy (Delpont, 2012). The application of such technology 194 
presented consortium partners with several technical challenges that significantly increased 195 
the project’s cost. 196 
 197 
Bifurcations and Catastrophic Phase Changes 198 
Bifurcation represents a situation where slight changes in the system’s parameters trigger a 199 
succession of continuous variations that culminate in a radical and sudden physical 200 
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transformation or reorganisation of a system’s behaviour (Robertson and Combs, 2014). 201 
Sellnow et al. (2002) state that bifurcation “represents the flashpoints of change where a 202 
system’s direction, character, and/or structure are fundamentally disrupted” leading to 203 
formation of new ones (p.271). As some parameters in a nonlinear system are varied, the 204 
system responds or adapts to the variations by undergoing physical modifications repeatedly 205 
or at regular intervals. Bifurcation is established when a nonlinear system can no longer adapt 206 
to changes and the system becomes chaotic (Schuldberg, 2011).  207 
 208 
Bifurcation is best illustrated by considering a slight variation of situation of a parameter (such 209 
as project scope) which then generates a need to adjust the original conditions of other 210 
parameters such as schedule, integration, quality and stakeholders’ management plans. Such 211 
action is necessary to ensure that a project is positioned to accommodate that change. It is 212 
likely therefore, that as a changes are being affected, errors are committed due to the interplay 213 
between endogenous and exogenous variables. For example, an erroneous forecasted inflation 214 
rate leads to financial pressure exerted upon contractors who cannot supply materials at costs 215 
originally quoted due to an unexpected hike in prices. Fast tracking may be employed to 216 
address the ensuing delays and ensure project completion within the approved schedule. 217 
However, such action may not permit sufficient time to plan for the smooth and efficient 218 
execution of some project activities. Consequently, unqualified workers may be forced to 219 
undertake some tasks further exacerbating the propensity for errors being committed. Changes 220 
continue to reinforce themselves until the project lurches from an apparent state of orderliness 221 
to randomness or total disorder. A system achieves a state of ‘total’ disorder when it no longer 222 
follows characteristic change patterns (Seeger, 2002).  223 
 224 
When a system experiences repeated changes, it becomes saturated with an infinite number 225 
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(nth) of potentially stable patterns. This outcome indicates that the system will continually 226 
oscillate from one mode to another and is unlikely to settle down until it lapses into a chaotic 227 
state. At every bifurcation point, a system rearranges itself into a new hybrid order that may 228 
significantly differ from its prior order until disorderliness ensues (Murphy, 1996; Sellnow et 229 
al., 2002). For instance, unexpected changes in environmental regulations of a country where 230 
an hydrocarbon megaproject is being executed may neccessitate a change in drilling 231 
operations and strategies. This change will equally stimulate further actions such as the 232 
recruitment of new drilling specialists and coconmittant process changes. Such a situation 233 
positions the project in a region between order and chaos, in which it attempts to settle into 234 
different steady states until it eventually reaches chaotic situation   235 
 236 
Bifurcation implies change scenarios, but there are different types in engineering and 237 
construction management systems such as emergent, strategic, planned and unplanned 238 
(Bamford and Forrester, 2003). Bifurcation occurs in various forms, depending on the nature 239 
of change but sudden changes or radical shifts in a system are referred to as catastrophic 240 
changes or ‘tipping points’ (Schuldberg, 2011). Murphy (1996) indicates that while the 241 
occurrence of bifurcations can be predicted, their outcomes cannot be. Thus, while project 242 
participants may foresee the impending crisis, predicting the result is impossible. 243 
 244 
Strange Attractors  245 
Not everything about dynamic systems is erratic; they are also attracted to an idealized state 246 
known as an attractor (Robertson and Combs, 2014). An attractors is the characteristic pattern 247 
of the process by which “a system self-organizes into coherence and adapts to maintain, sustain 248 
or recreate order when subject to change from either internal functioning or external influence” 249 
(Pryor and Bright, 2007). According to Murphy (1996), an attractor represents an organizing 250 
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principle that a system settles into a particular form irrespective of the level of randomness it 251 
may experience. Strange attractors indicate that while dynamic systems can move into an 252 
orderly pattern for a short duration, they still exhibit chaotic characteristics and never settle 253 
down (Robertson and Combs, 2014). For instance, they do not repeat the same model twice and 254 
are hence, unpredictable (Tsoukas, 1998; Robertson and Combs, 2014). 255 
 256 
A practical example of a strange attractor is the ability to make correct predictions about 257 
particular parameters (such as risks on a short-term basis) but the inability to indicate the 258 
stability of a project system. There is a point during a project’s implementation when system 259 
stability can be achieved whether through actions taken or otherwise; albeit, the system never 260 
settles permanently into that stable condition. For instance, an onshore facility with specific 261 
engineering design flaws that may threaten the project’s sucess could be detected during quality 262 
checks; at this state, the project behaves as a chaotic model. A particular set of experienced 263 
design engineers could be drafted in temporarily to resolve this problem or realise a reasonable 264 
level of system equilibrium. This process represents a transition from a chaotic model to a stable 265 
pattern for the project system. However, the decision to employ experts may result in unwanted 266 
tension and crisis of confidence for the original design team. This outcome could polarise 267 
design engineers and create conflicts trhoughout the project team thereby instigating the 268 
production of a faulty component that may require a complex solution. The possibility of 269 
relating to the project’s future patterns in this particular situation captures the essence of a 270 
strange attractor. Yet, such understanding of the design problem is ephemeral as those 271 
associated risks may still adversely affect the project’s performance. This scenario 272 
demonstrates that it is hard to predict the next behavior of a system that now appears stable 273 
especially as new unexpected changes may arise later due to continuous interactions of 274 
components or factors connected with the system (Grassberger and Procaccia, 2004).  275 
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 276 
Chaos Theory and the Megaproject  277 
Principles of chaos theory are applicable in many fields of science. For instance, choas 278 
theory has explained events in economics (Kelsey, 1988; Federici and Gandolfo, 2014); cost 279 
accounting (Tse and Robb, 1994); organisation (van Eijnatten and Putnik, 2004; Daft, 2012); 280 
marketing (Doherty and Delener, 2001; Gummesson, 2006); built environment (Lu et al., 281 
2010); management (Frear, 2011); and engineering (Strogatz, 2014). Despite its ubiquity, its 282 
application to megaprojects is embryonic probably because chaos theory is widely associated 283 
with natural systems such as meteorological conditions (Levy, 1994). Nonetheless, 284 
megaprojects exhibit features of chaotic theory in which their behavior cannot be easily 285 
modelled and predicted (Newell et al., 2008; Whitty and Maylor, 2009).  286 
 287 
While studies such as Newell et al. (2008) and Whitty and Maylor (2009) referred to a 288 
megaproject as a system incorporating components that are closely interrelated, it remains 289 
unknown as to whether data sets exist, which encapsulate a web of interconnections 290 
embedded within them. Outcomes of hydrocarbon megaprojects, reflect systems that are 291 
characterised by essential principles of chaos theory. For example, they exhibit unpredictable 292 
and systemic changes that are influenced by complex interactions of numerous variables 293 
(Merrow, 2011). Such variables may include human error, stakeholders, cultural 294 
diversity, environmental and safety complications, site conditions, logistics 295 
complexities, political climate, technological and technical intricacies  and workers’ 296 
incompetence.  297 
For one ongoing LNG megaproject development in Australia, obtaining access to an 298 
adequate number of experienced workers required for the timely and efficient running 299 
of the project represents a major challenge. Strict immigration visa rules, local content 300 
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regulations and professional registration barriers have hampered the drive to recruit 301 
experienced overseas workers. This situation led to operators and contractors increasing 302 
wages for people to work on busy rosters to enhance their performance. However, 303 
workers voiced their frustrations regarding these unfavorable rosters (despite increases 304 
in remuneration to appease their dissatisfaction) and industrial action was taken 305 
(Macdonald-Smith, 2015b). This incident decelerated the work progress and 306 
compounded the project’s already poor performance; according to one worker: “…it’s 307 
not all about money.” Inclement weather conditions together with environmental 308 
requirements have also presented obstacles to labor productivity. The project is now 309 
several months behind schedule with a cost overrun of at least 60% experienced so far 310 
and is under severe pressure from its sponsors and investors. Under such conditions the 311 
possibility of further errors occurring remains high. This case demonstrates how 312 
complex interactions often affect the execution of hydrocarbon megaprojects, which 313 
bring about unpredictable changes to these systems.     314 
 315 
The application of chaos theory to natural systems is different from that of a 316 
hydrocarbon megaproject as the source of unpredictability is dissimilar (Levy, 1994). 317 
Unpredictability in natural systems can be attributed to spontaneous interactions, 318 
nonlinearity, and lack of ability to determine initial conditions and structure of the 319 
system with infinite accuracy (Singh and Singh, 2002). In hydrocarbon megaprojects, 320 
unpredictability results from interactions of components subjected to interventions by 321 
individuals and organizations (Levy, 1994); human agency contributes to the chaotic 322 
behaviour (Heylighen, 2006). During the Rabigh oil refinery megaproject, an oversight 323 
by the design team led to errors in its preliminary engineering design which only 324 
became apparent when over-sized equipment arrived and could not be fitted into the 325 
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space allocated (Luciani, 2007). Engineering issues and scope changes were identified 326 
as major factors that contributed to the project cost’s increasing from US$3billion to 327 
US$9.8billion (Luciani, 2007). In another oilfield development project, carelessness of 328 
the project team resulted in them making decisions on Front End Engineering Design 329 
(FEED) packages that failed to capture a specific engineering requirements and resulted 330 
in costly changes ocurring.  331 
  332 
Applicability of Chaos Theory to Cost Overruns  333 
The disorder and nonlinear characteristics of hydrocarbon megaprojects share many 334 
similar principles associated with chaos theory. These characteristics include: long-335 
term unpredictability; high probability of sudden change occurring; short-term stability 336 
and predictability; and aggravation of pre-existing conditions with corrective actions. 337 
Hence, chaos theory can help to explain how cost overruns develop. Each of these 338 
features and their applications to cost overruns are discussed in turn.    339 
 340 
Long-term Unpredictability 341 
Emergent overruns can be explained by their sensitivity to initial conditions. In hydrocarbon 342 
megaprojects, small variations in initial conditions create multiplying effects over time due to 343 
nonlinear relationships that exist between their different project parameters (e.g. risks, scope, 344 
and quality) and activities. Consequently, accurately predicting the possible consequences of 345 
minor changes to a system is problematic. In the case of an LNG facility, an omission in the 346 
piping and instrumentation diagrams produced in the FEED package had negative implications 347 
for the execution of key project components much later (Hwang et al., 2012). Due to the error, 348 
pipeline construction could not proceed without rectifying the problem. In addition, the 349 
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problem resulted in delayed completion of LNG jetty and storage tanks thereby instigating low 350 
labor productivity and cost overruns. This case stresses some of the difficulties of forecasting 351 
the long-term effects of a minor change. 352 
 353 
Hydrocarbon megaprojects are usually grounded by the long-term forecasts predetermined 354 
long before construction commences (Asrilhant et al., 2004). For example, cost and 355 
schedule estimates are invariably established during, and are expected to be managed and 356 
controlled throughout the project’s implementation cycle (Burke, 2013). More often, 357 
forecasts are unreliable by the time they reach the construction phase (Castillo and Dorao, 358 
2013). Multiple cases of significant cost and schedule overruns in hydrocarbon 359 
megaprojects support this assertion. Notwithstanding, it is believed that careful planning 360 
and clear-cut definition of initial conditions would help make better future predictions 361 
(Berends, 2007). In fact, lessons learned from previous related megaprojects are usually 362 
incorporated to establish such predictions (Berends, 2007). This approach aligns with 363 
conventional project management thinking which assumes that projects can be known 364 
thoroughly from the very beginning and achieving success is a matter of active applications of 365 
standard tools and techniques. Yet, conventional project management neglects latent 366 
uncertainties that usually manifest themselves during the construction phase (Cleden, 2012).  367 
 368 
According to chaos theory, the benefits of forecasts in regards to achieving project success 369 
may not be as remarkable as believed. The theory suggests that the future of a megaproject 370 
cannot be built entirely on experiences gathered from similar past megaprojects (Doherty 371 
and Delener, 2001). This situation arises as each megaproject is unique and lessons learn 372 
are not transferrable to another (Levy, 1994). The non-repeatability of lessons can be 373 
explained by the fact that issues interact and the manner in which interfaces differ from 374 
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one megaproject to another. Chaos theory therefore, suggests that in addition to lessons 375 
learned, the unique and dynamic nature of interactions that exist between different 376 
components should also be focused upon.  377 
 378 
Predictability is practically infeasible in megaprojects as they are characteristically long 379 
in duration, complex and dependent on high levels of technical content and technology 380 
usage.  In some cases, technologies applied are either untested or designed specifically 381 
for the project. When ‘off-the-shelf’ technologies are adopted, they need to be integrated 382 
into the project system to deliver its core goals. In the case of oil and gas field 383 
development in Kazakhstan, conventional drilling and production technologies such as 384 
concrete structures or jacket platforms resting on the seabed (steel jacket) were unuseable 385 
due to geological and geographical constraints (NCOC, 2013). Instead, offshores facilities 386 
were installed on artificial islands (drilling islands and hub islands) to protect them from 387 
harsh weather (NCOC, 2013). Consequently, it was difficult to determine how the projects 388 
would evolve over time. Uncertainties that dominated the project environment, therefore, 389 
provided fertile ground for cost overruns to germinate and massive cost overruns were 390 
experienced (Barinov, 2007)  391 
 392 
High Probability of Sudden Change Occurring  393 
Conventional project management suggests that small changes in parameters should only 394 
produce a reciprocal change in the project. For instance, a minor addition to scope should only 395 
incur a commeasurable cost. Such paradigm in conventional project management forces project 396 
managers to underestimate the possibility of a particular small event producing significant 397 
upsets. In the case of the Sakhalin megaproject, a slight change to the drilling fluids due to 398 
government and environmental regulations was not expected to cause major well construction 399 
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challenges (Thorogood et al., 2006). That supposed small change, however, eventually led to 400 
equipment failures and affected the wellbore stability; in culmination, sudden prolong delays 401 
in the drilling operations were experienced which contributed significantly to the project’s cost 402 
overrun.    403 
 404 
If hydrocarbon megaprojects were regarded as chaotic systems, small changes would not be 405 
expected to yield small reciprocal effects throughout its life cycle. With this mind, a project 406 
manager may anticipate that every action in the course of a project’s implementation can 407 
potentially change its results beyond logical expectation. In a typical hydrocarbon megaproject 408 
in which several changes are expected, the chance of it overrunning or underrunning its cost 409 
are high. The continuous and close interactions between numerous variables (such as those 410 
related to procurement, stakeholders, technologies, specific country laws, technicality, 411 
environmental, logistics and leadership) make hydrocarbon megaprojects more sensitive to 412 
every event or change (both positive and negative) that occurs within the system. For instance, 413 
ignoring or failing to recognize stakeholder demands may galvanize significant problems. This 414 
was illustrated in the Sakhalin LNG project were failure to employ practical strategies for 415 
managing stakeholders’ demands to protect 100 whales fueled protests and delays that 416 
contributed to massive cost overruns (Ray, 2008).  417 
 418 
As some variables influence the initial conditions of a megaproject, it is difficult to 419 
isolate and effectively control their rate of change using conventional project 420 
management approaches (Singh and Singh, 2002). This circumstance is due to conventional 421 
project management practices not having been sufficiently designed to track and control 422 
numerous changes that are capable of derailing projects’ objectives (Cooke-Davies et al., 423 
2007). Variables that can create a disturbance in the initial conditions of a cost estimate 424 
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are myriad and include: unknowable error during the cost estimation; unpredictability of 425 
project team behavior; unanticipated changes in climatic conditions; political unrest; 426 
geographical conditions; exchange rate fluctuations; changes in legislation; and 427 
unaccounted loss of productivity. These aforementioned variables can trigger sudden 428 
spontaneous changes to initial conditions thereby increasing a project’s cost (Bardyn and 429 
Fitzgerald, 2005). For example, a sudden and sharp rise in the value of the currency of 430 
the project’s domicile country means foreign stakeholders have to commit additional  431 
funds to ensure the asset is delivered.  432 
 433 
Short-term Stability and Predictability   434 
Despite the general belief that nonlinear or chaotic systems are unstable and unpredictable, 435 
they do not always lack a pattern (Murphy, 1996) and can be orderly and predictable over a 436 
short period (Levy, 1994). However, such orderliness and predictability may lead the project 437 
teams to become unaware when the system happens to be chaotic and unpredictable. Due to a 438 
megaproject system settling down into a particular and temporary order, it is possible to make 439 
precise near future predictions about the project (Robertson and Combs, 2014). Understanding 440 
and knowing about environmental risks due to a project system being attracted to a short 441 
orderly pattern, may be useful in making forecasts about their possible effects and developing 442 
appropriate mitigating actions (Asrilhant et al., 2004). If project teams are aware that 443 
environmental rights groups could escalate an issue, then they can make provisions for 444 
addressing their demands. Project teams could determine what actions  may be required to 445 
douse any tension that the groups might want to generate. But the project teams are unable to 446 
predict the consequences of such actions in the future. 447 
 448 
Chaotic megaprojects systems experience a certain level of order, despite thriving in 449 
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disorderliness, due to the interrelatedness of their components (Lu et al., 2010). In the case of 450 
the East of Shetland Pipeline (EOSP), for example, a seam weld failure in gas pipelines during 451 
their fabrication was not detected until a final hydrostatic test was conducted (Macdonald, 452 
2007). The detection of gas pipeline leaks was attributable to the interactions of several factors 453 
such as quality assurance activities and integration management procedures within the project 454 
system. The ability to detect the pipeline failure represents a trace of orderliness. Without the 455 
system’s patterns being stable, it would be difficult to detect the fault. The interaction of 456 
multiple actions helped stabilize the project system and led to the failure’s discovery 457 
(Macdonald, 2007). At this point, much of the attention was on fixing the faulty gas pipelines 458 
with no comprehensive strategies developed for managing possible problems that could arise 459 
from dependent activities such as installation of compressors. As quality checks were not 460 
carried out on the installation of certain integrated reciprocating compressors, they were misfit 461 
and rework was needed thus engendering further delays and project costs. 462 
 463 
Aggravation of Pre-existing Problems with Corrective Actions    464 
The conventional method of managing projects is grounded in reductionism, determinism and 465 
perfectionism (Heylighen, 2006). This approach suggests that actions or interventions can be 466 
taken to ensure the realization of a stable system. In the context of conventional project 467 
management, corrective actions are expected or designed to regulate or normalize faulty system. 468 
It is against this thinking that several methods have been designed to check and correct changes 469 
in a project during implementation and monitoring/ controlling phases. This action is to 470 
ensure that overall specific objectives are being achieved (Burke, 2013). For instance, 471 
schedule compression techniques such as fast tracking and crashing are usually employed to 472 
address project delays (Swink, 2003). These techniques are expected to return a project back to 473 
its original schedule in the face of delays.  474 
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 475 
Multiple interfaces exist between variables that affect the performance of megaprojects. As 476 
such, corrective actions aimed to address problems may aggravate them without being realized 477 
(Badiru and Osisanya, 2013). A case in point is the application of project crashing to deal with 478 
apparent delays. Such action, although designed to address schedule problems, may influence 479 
errors or omissions to occur because of the effects of crashing activity on the project system 480 
(Howick and Eden, 2001). In the process of undertaking a crashing exercise, workers may be 481 
subjected to lengthy overtime that can reduce labor productivity due to exhaustion, absenteeism, 482 
decreased work rates, increased injury rates, increased error rates and increased turnover rates. 483 
So more hours are expended to complete overtime tasks and labor costs rise beyond expectation. 484 
This scenario demonstrates how corrective actions can worsen problems and add to project 485 
costs. Chaos theory implies that corrective actions may exacerbate problems they are expected 486 
to address (Murphy, 1996). Considering this notion, project teams must vet every corrective 487 
action they intend to implement for addressing problems if they are to avoid complicating issues 488 
further. Although corrective actions are useful and unavoidable in the successful completion of 489 
a megaproject, chaos theory suggests they must be carefully selected and used to achieve 490 
desired results.  491 
  492 
Implications for Research   493 
The implications of this research are threefold. First, there is an implied degree of 494 
ambiguity with current conceptualization of hydrocarbon megaprojects which are 495 
conceived as linear systems. A new reconceptualization is needed to better understand why 496 
and how they perform; a superficial understanding of their characteristics and cost overrun 497 
causation currently exists due to the assumption of a stable system. Without a better 498 
understanding of the dynamics, behavior and nature of these projects, cost overruns will 499 
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unfortunately remain an innate feature of their existence. More research studies are needed to 500 
incisively define hydrocarbon megaprojects and assist in the development of best-in-501 
class practice and solutions to improve project performance. 502 
 503 
Second, while this paper has generated new and important conceptual categories 504 
concerning the implications of chaos theory for cost overruns in hydrocarbon 505 
megaprojects, these require validation via empirical evidence. The current paucity of 506 
empirical evidence has contributed to a misunderstanding of practice. An empirical study 507 
conducted through the lens of chaos theory will foster better understanding of 508 
management practice suitable for hydrocarbon megaprojects subject to the richness of 509 
data accrued. However, researchers should be cognizant that oil and gas companies are 510 
often reluctant to provide data regarding cost overruns for fear that it could potentially 511 
provide a negative view of their projects and adversely influence their share price and/or 512 
their ability to raise future capital investments. 513 
 514 
Third, a model is required that explains the nature of chaotic dynamics (e.g. labor, 515 
logistics, technology and external factors) that contribute to cost overruns.  The model 516 
could be used to determine whether the influence of factors such as labor , structure and 517 
culture, logistics, technical and technology on cost overruns is mediated by the principles of 518 
chaos theory. It will also assist in generating a greater understanding of the importance or 519 
otherwise of chaos theory in the management study of megaprojects. 520 
Undoubtedly, the significant consequences of cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects 521 
requires a research agenda that strives to develop strategies to mitigate them using the lens of 522 
chaos theory. Providing recommendations for improving cost performance is a pressing issue 523 
within the industry especially considering the falling price of oil and gas. Such suggestions 524 
22 
 
would improve a project’s viability and instill confidence in oil and gas investors.     525 
 526 
Conclusion 527 
Research on cost overruns within the context of hydrocarbon projects has been limited and 528 
practitioners are largely reliant upon consultancy firms’ reports. These reports typically include 529 
information on instances of cost overruns but rarely state ‘how’ they occur. The behavior of 530 
complex project systems must be first comprehended to understand how cost overruns develop. 531 
This paper has proposed that emergence of cost overruns in hydrocarbon megaproject systems 532 
can be explained through the lens of chaos theory. Developing and field testing theories on cost 533 
overruns in hydrocarbon megaprojects would be a useful step towards augmenting knowledge 534 
on this problem. Such actions would also assist in formulating cost-optimal preventative 535 
techniques or solutions to this persistent problem. Reduction of cost overruns in hydrocarbon 536 
megaprojects will increase capital investments in the sector and raise profit margins for all 537 
parties involved in these ventures.   538 
 539 
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